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Abstract
Corporate governance carries strategic importance and should be addressed correctly
by decision makers. Corporate finance literature suggests that diverse boards are a
part of good corporate governance practice. However, it is not clear how good
corporate governance- particularly diverse board characteristics might affect the
corporate innovation and innovation search strategies. Utilizing the data from 25
banks listed in the UAE stock exchanges, this study evaluates the impact of
boardroom diversity on firm innovativeness both before and after the drop in the oil
prices. The results show that while gender and education do not significantly affect
innovativeness of banks, having more experienced and independent board members
enhances the innovation. The effect of experienced board members on innovation is
more pronounced during the oil price drop period, while the effect of independent
board members decrease after the drop in the oil prices.
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1-Introduction
The board of directors carries out a very important role in corporations. By
advising and monitoring the managers, board of directors reduces the agency costs
and guides the companies to their missions. Hence, better and improved firm
performance and subsequently enhanced overall value for the whole society starts
from the boardrooms. Previous literature confirms the effect of boardroom diversity
on firm value (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003; Carter et al., 2010). However,
in today’s world, better firm value is not the only goal for the corporations. Firms
have to seek innovative technologies and ideas in order to survive in the long term.
During the last decade, the corporate world has seen that firms that cannot keep up
with the latest technologies and do not adopt innovative approaches are doomed to
failure.
Innovation provides a competitive advantage for organizations in the
globalized business environment (De Dreu, 2006; Eisenbeiss, et. al., 2006). Creating
new knowledge through innovation is viewed as the core of organizational success
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The importance of innovation for organizational
success has been increasingly noted in the literature (Agars, et. al., 2008; Anderson,
et. al., 2004; West, 2002). In today’s world, firms have to seek innovative
technologies and ideas in order to succeed in the long term.
Innovation literature has investigated several aspects of innovation such as
how innovation affects firm performance (Hitt, et. al. 1996); how leaders affect
employees’ innovativeness (Scott and Bruce, 1994); how managerial compensation
improves innovation (Baranchuk et. al. 2014) and how CEO and top management
characteristics lead to innovation (Hirshleifer et. al., 2012; Chemmanur et al., 2014).
However, there is not enough evidence on the effects of board characteristics on firm
innovativeness. To fulfill that gap in the literature, this study aims to investigate
whether having diverse boards leads to enhance corporate innovation both during
good times and during hard times in the UAE.
Boardroom diversity is fully supported by the leaders of the UAE. In 2012, the
UAE cabinet has approved that each corporate board is required to have at least one
female member at the board. This study extends beyond the gender diversity and
looks for experience, education, as well as independence of the board of directors and
their subsequent impact on corporate innovativeness. The sample is divided into two
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economic regimes: before and after the oil price drop to understand what type of
board characteristics perform better and support innovativeness during good and bad
times.
Measuring innovation is one of the challenges for innovation studies. While
most of the studies use self-reported innovation data gathered from surveys, some use
data on R&D expenditures or number of patents. However, most patents do not
transform into tangible goods and profit for the firm (Stevens and Burley, 1997).
Therefore, instead of using subjective measures of innovation from questionnaires or
traditional innovation outputs, we follow Bos et.al. (2013) and examine bank’s ability
to minimize costs through innovations. In order to measure that, first we estimate
annual minimum cost frontiers to create a global frontier and then measure each
bank’s distance to the global frontier to obtain its technology gap. If the bank
manages to innovate, technology gap decreases. This measure allows us to examine
the innovation objectively in banks, which unlike manufacturing firms, in general
don’t have patents and R&D expenditures.
The results show that having more experienced and independent members on
banks’ boardrooms enhances the innovation. The effect of experienced board
members on innovation is more pronounced during the oil price drop period, while
the effect of independent board members decrease after the drop in the oil prices.
Besides, being a pioneer study testing the effect of various patterns of boardroom
diversity and corporate innovation, the results of this study will help policy makers to
address and formulate new rules or regulations to enhance corporate governance
practices, which will lead to better overall value for all society.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
overview of the literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. The data and
methodology is explained in Section 4. The results are presented in Section 5 and
Section 6 concludes.
2- Literature Review
The effects of boardroom diversity on enhanced corporate governance is a
hotly debated issue and it has been receiving a well-deserved, growing attention of
many researchers. Corporate governance literature has shown that beyond the effect
on firm value (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003; Carter et al., 2010; Iren 2016),
3

boardroom diversity enhances boardroom decision making by lessening the tendency
to engage in groupthink (O’Connor, 2006), increasing the diversity of opinions
represented in the boardroom (Ramirez, 2003 & Polden, 2005) and having positive
cognitive effects such as creativity, innovation, new ideas and insights (Ruigrok et al.,
2007; Kang et al., 2007; Deutsch, 2005; Miller and Triana, 2009). Therefore, diverse
boardrooms could fuel the innovation activities and influence the level of firm
innovation. However, diverse boards might also have coordination problems, might
lack cohesion and need a longer time to reach decisions. In this perspective, it is
important to understand whether boardroom diversity leads or hinders the innovation.
Innovation is considered to be one of the most important determinants of firm
performance (Torchia et. al, 2011). Firms seeking for long-term survival have to
employ innovative technologies and ideas. Innovation helps firms gain competitive
advantage (Hitt et al., 1996) and expand market share (Franko, 1989). Creating new
knowledge through innovation is viewed as the core of organizational success
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The importance of innovation for organizational
success has been increasingly noted in the literature (Agars et. al. 2008; Anderson et.
al. 2004; West, 2002).
Some recent studies have looked in how corporate governance such as
managerial compensation (Baranchuk et. al., 2014); CEO and top management
characteristics (Hirshleifer, et. al., 2012; Chemmanur et al., 2014) or institutional
ownership (Aghion et. al., 2013) affects the innovation. Balsmeier, et. al. (2014)
show that firms, which have independent directors with a background from more
innovative firms, tend to be more innovative. However, there is not enough evidence
on the effects of different board characteristics on firm innovativeness. Particularly,
there are no studies focused on Middle Eastern economies.
Financial innovation for banks can be grouped into new products such as
ATMs, credit or debit cards cards; new production processes such as securitization of
loans; and new organizational forms such as diversified banks with traditional and
non traditional services (Frame and White, 2004). Hannan and McDowell (1984)
show that market concentration affects the use of ATMs. Hirtle (2009) shows that as
banks use more credit derivatives, the credit supply to large firms increases. Nadauld
and Weisbach (2012) show that securitization lowers the borrowing costs.

Franke

and Krahnen (2005) document that the use of collateralized debt obligations lead to an
increase in bank lending. On the other hand, some other studies find that financial
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innovation can actually harm the economy by increasing risk-taking (Wagner, 2007),
reduction in lending standards and hence causing fragility (Keys et. al. 2010; Dell’
Ariccia et. al. 2008; Gennaioli et. al., 2012). In order to have a wider perspective on
banking innovation, we’ve used a measure not only focusing on the introduction and
use of specific bank technologies or processes. Following Bos et.al. (2013), we’ve
used an overall innovation measure of innovation. Utilizing that measure, we’ve
investigated whether having diverse boards leads to an enhanced innovation both
during good times and during hard times.
Prior evidence about the impact of economic crisis on corporate innovation
has been ambiguous. On one hand economic crisis limits the social financial
capabilities to invest into new products and/or technologies, and on the other hand the
crisis filters the incompetent market players and creates additional incentives and
opportunities to existing players to innovate and advance for higher chance of
survival.
On the positive side, Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) addresses the impact of
the economic downturn on innovation across Europe. Using micro- and macro-data,
they find that the competences and quality of the human resources, the specialization
in the high-technology sector, together with the development of the financial system
seem to be the structural factors which are able to offset the effect of the economic
downturn on innovation investments of firms across Europe. Archibugi et. al. (2013a)
found that the 2008 economic crisis led to a concentration of innovative activities
within a small group of fast growing new firms and those firms already highly
innovative before the crisis. The companies in pursuit of more explorative strategies
towards new product and market developments cope better with the crisis. Archibugi
et. al. (2013b) survey European firms to compare drivers of innovation investment
before, during and following the 2008 financial crisis. They found that before the
crisis, incumbent enterprises are more likely to expand their innovation investment,
while after the crisis a few, small enterprises and new entrants are ready to “swim
against the stream” by expanding their innovative related expenditures.
On the negative perspective, Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2009) use a sample of
3,000 Italian firms and found that firms with a high share of flexible workers, high
labor turnover and lower costs of labor (relative to capital) experienced significantly
lower rates of labor productivity growth, a labor productivity crisis. They argue that
the crisis in Italian labor productivity growth is caused by the lack of labor innovation
5

resulted from a low-productive and labor-intensive growth path. Paunov (2012)
documented that the crisis led many firms to stop ongoing innovation projects. She
also finds that firms with access to public funding were less likely to abandon these
investments, while younger firms and businesses supplying foreign multinationals or
suffering export shocks were more likely to do so.
Given the mixed results in the previous literature, this study aims to contribute
to the debate by examining the impact of recent oil price plunge since 2014, which
has been a series of nightmares to many oil producing nations, on the corporate
governance and innovation among the banks in the UAE.
3- Hypotheses
Existence of female directors can bring diverse opinions, different knowledge
and expertise to the boards (Daily and Dalton, 2003; Huse, 2007). These different
perspectives might positively contribute to the firm innovation (Miller and Triana,
2009). Therefore, we can expect the gender diversity enhance bank innovation.
Hypothesis 1: Gender diversity on boards has a significant positive impact on bank
innovation.
Educational level of directors might affect directors’ perspectives, cognition
and decision making. Wincent et. al. (2010) found that the total number of board
members with undergraduate degrees has a positive impact on innovation. Similarly,
Dalziel et. al. (2011) showed that the number of directors who have degrees from elite
institutions positively impact R&D expenditures. Therefore, we can expect the
educational level of directors to positively affect firm innovation.
Hypothesis 2: Directors’ education level has a significant positive impact on bank
innovation.
Hillman et. al. (2000) argue that experienced directors bring expertise and
knowledge of strategic decision making. As directors spend more time serving on
boards, they build more firm-specific expertise, which subsequently enhances
directors’ decision making. Therefore, we can expect a positive relationship between
6

director experience and firm innovation.
Hypothesis 3: Having more experienced directors on boards has a significant positive
impact on bank innovation.
Previous literature focusing on the impact of independent directors shows that
independent boards are more likely to reach decisions, which are in line with
shareholder-wealth maximization (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, this tough
monitoring role of independent directors might lead managers to dismiss exploratory
and innovative strategies (Manso, 2011). Faleye et. al. (2011) find that independent
director existence in boards leads to less patents. This result is inconsistent with the
guardian role that the agency theory assigns to outside, independent directors (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, Hoskisson et. al. (2002) found out that
presence of independent directors increases external innovation. Independent directors
do not have the experience or deep knowledge about the firm’s daily operations; as a
result, their risk perceptions might be different. (Hoskisson et. al. 2002) Therefore,
they might support innovation, which might seem risky for inside directors. Hence,
we can expect a positive or a negative impact of independent directors.
Hypothesis 4: Having independent directors on boards has a significant positive/
negative impact on bank innovation.
3- Data and Methodology
3.1

Data
The sample consists of 25 banks listed in UAE stock markets, in which 14

banks are listed in Abu Dhabi Stock Market (ASM) and 11 banks are listed in Dubai
Financial Market (DFM). Firm governance variables, such as board and ownership
data are hand collected from bank financial reports. Year-end financial data of each
bank are gathered from BankScope and DataStream. These two databases
complement each other for the missing data. The sample period is from 2012 to 2015.
On September 2014, oil price has started to fall and it didn’t come back to its price
before. Therefore, we’ve divided the sample into two and considered two separate
economic regimes: An economic booming period where the oil price stayed above
7

$90/barrel (2012-13) and a recession period where the oil price fell under $60/barrel
(2014-15).
3.2

Measuring Innovation - Technology gaps
Following Bos et al. (2013), we calculate technology gap between a firm and a

benchmark covering all available technologies as a proxy for the innovation. We
measure the technology gap of each firm by using an array of different indicators
reflecting both input into and output of financial innovations. According to Bos et.
al.(2013), firms are always assumed to minimize production cost along with the
invention or adoption of new technology. To present the idea of such technical change
in cost function, we apply a meta frontier approach, as introduced in the early work by
Hayami and Ruttan (1970), Mundlak and Hellinghausen (1982) and Lau and
Yotopoulos (1989). The meta frontier represents the set of available technologies
across firms and/or across time. Technical change consists of the application of a new
technology as measured against the benchmark meta frontier, which combines all
available technologies.
To obtain technology gap of each firm in each year, we apply Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) to estimate the minimum cost frontier available in each year
and then envelop the annual cost frontiers to obtain a meta frontier1.
In the first step, the following annual translog cost frontiers are estimated
using stochastic frontier analysis:

TCit = f * ( wit , yit , zit )evit +uit
where w represents the vector of input prices, y is the output vector, z is a vector of
control variables, v is random noise assumed to be i.i.d., and u is the inefficiency term
assumed to be i.i.d. To take inefficiency into account, we use stochastic frontier
analysis, which is ignored by conventional measures of productivity (e.g., TFP) that
measure technical change as efficiency change.
It is assumed that the banks minimize total costs and operate in perfectly
1

Refer to Hayami and Ruttan (1970), Mundlak and Hellinghausen (1982), and Lau
and Yotopoulos (1989)
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competitive input markets. Bank production is modeled using the well-known
intermediation approach. Output y consists of year-end stocks of loans, investments,
and off-balance sheet items. Input w corresponds to the prices of fixed assets, labor,
and borrowed funds. The equity ratio z is included as a control variable to account for
different risk profiles of banks (Hughes and Mester (1993)). Cost efficiency score
estimates are obtained as follows:

CEit = exp(!µˆit )
where CE equals one for banks that operate on the annual frontier (no inefficiency).
Banks with inefficiencies operate above the annual cost frontier and have cost
efficiency scores less than one.
In the second step, the meta frontier is estimated as the envelope around the
annual cost frontiers. We utilize the parameter estimates for the annual cost frontiers
and obtain estimates of the technology gap (GAP) by fitting the minimum cost meta
frontier (fmeta) as follows:
T

N

Min.Distance = "" | ln f * ( wit , yit , zit ) ! ln f meta ( wit , yit , zit ) |
t =1 i =1

subject to

ln f * (.) ! ln f meta (.)

In this constrained minimization problem, the absolute distance between the
annual cost frontier and the meta frontier is minimized subject to the constraint that
the total cost from the annual frontier is equal to or larger than total cost from the
meta frontier. As a result, the technology gap is defined as:

GAPit =

f meta ( wit , yit , zit )
f * ( wit , yit , zit )

Innovations by firms may lead to improvements in their technology set and,
consequently, a smaller gap between the current technology set and the (potentially
available) best technology set, or meta frontier. The result is an increase in GAPit,
which is bounded between 0 and 100, where the latter is reached when firms operate
on the meta frontier.
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The technology gap of a leader that is positioned on the global frontier in two
consecutive periods will maintain a technology gap equal to one. Likewise, a laggard
can close the technology gap by lowering his cost (catching up) and moving towards
the global frontier (lowering the technology gap). Neck-and-neck firms may operate
on the annual cost frontier under the best potential available technology in the current
period and, subsequently, shift the annual cost frontier towards the global frontier in
the next period by improving their technology set through innovations. In sum, the
technology gap as a measure of overall innovation agrees with the concept of
innovation proposed by Aghion et al. (2005).
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the innovation index and its
components. On average, the innovation index is 93.21 for the sample banks. Average
loans exceeds the investments and off balance sheet items. Typically, the amount of
total of loans, investments and off balance sheet items exceeds the amount of fixed
assets, labor and borrowed funds.
3.3

Measuring Governance Variables
In order to measure the governance characteristics, we’ve considered several

variables such as:
Hypothesis Variables
i. Gender: This variable is a dummy variable that equals ‘1’ if the bank has at
least 1 female director.
ii. Education: This is measured by two variables:
a. Ed_Und is the proportion of directors having undergraduate education
qualification.
b. Ed_Grad is the proportion of directors having graduate education
qualification.
iii. Experience: This is measured by the number of years directors are serving at
the bank.
iv. Proportion of Independent Directors: This variable indicates the proportion of
outside independent directors to the total number of directors on the board of
the firm. Following the resource dependency approach, boards dominated by
independent directors are expected to be more effective.
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Control Variables
i. Board Size: This variable shows the total number of directors on the board of a
company.
ii. CEO-Chairperson Duality: This variable is a dummy variable that equals ‘1’ if
the CEO is not the chairman or vice-chairman of the board of directors and ‘0’
otherwise. Even where CEO and Chairman/vice-chairman are different
individuals but belong to the same family based on name recognition, we have
considered it as a case of CEO-Chair duality.
iii. Number of Board Meetings: In UAE, companies usually hold at least one
board meeting in each quarter i.e. a minimum of four meetings in a financial
year. The frequency of holding the board meetings has been factored in by
way of a dummy variable which equals ‘1’ if a company has held more than
four meetings in a financial year and ‘0’ otherwise.
iv. Ownership structure: government (major shareholders) ownership, which
indicates the proportion of government ownership to the total shareholders.
v. Bank size: This variable is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets of
banks operating in the UAE.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables. Banks in the
sample have an average of 8 directors on the board, where almost half of them are
independent directors (3.9). On average, government is the biggest shareholder for the
banks in the sample.
3.4

Methodology
The following two models are regressed in both the booming period (2012-

2013) and the recession period (2014-2015). In each case, we use panel data
methodology using the generalized least square (GLS) random effect method. Both
the innovation index and the governance index range from 0 to 100.
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Table 3 exhibits the descriptive statistics for the independent variables. The
banks in the sample have very few female directors on their boards. They have more
directors with undergraduate degree than directors with graduate degrees and on
average directors have around seven years of experience in the bank.
4- Results
Before analyzing the effects of board of directors’ characteristics on
innovation and governance, the sample is divided into two periods and a mean
comparison is conducted to see what has changed for the banks after the oil price
drop. Table 4 shows the results of the mean comparison tests. Before and after the
crisis, only the experience of the directors is significantly different. After the oil price
crisis, the directors were replaced by the ones with higher experience (average of 7
years post-crisis when compared to average of 4 years pre- crisis) After the crisis, the
number of board meetings were significantly reduced from 10 on average to 8 on
average. And on average while the loans have increased after the oil price increase,
investments have significantly decreased.
Table 5 shows the results of the regression analysis. Existence of female
directors on boards has no effect on innovation. This can be attributed to the low level
of female representation on the boards of banks in the sample. Also, existence of
board members with undergraduate degrees does not have a significant effect on
innovation. This could be expected, as holding at least an undergraduate degree is the
usual norm to become a board member. Experience of board members have a positive
significant impact on the innovation index for the overall sample period. When the
sample is divided, experience has a more enhanced impact during the recession
period. The results suggest that during hard times experience can be more valuable
and improve the innovativeness of the banks.

Also, the independence of board

members has a significant positive impact on bank innovation. However, the effect is
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more pronounced before the crisis period. Besides, CEO/Chairman duality has no
significant impact on innovation for the whole sample. But, when the tests are
repeated for booming and recession periods separately, it is noticed that the CEO/
Chairman duality improves the bank innovation for the booming period, while the
same effect is not observed for the recession period.
5-Conclusion
Better corporate governance practices are very much desired all over the
world. However, it is not clear if better corporate governance improves the firm
innovativeness or not. This study aims to list the main board characteristics, which
lead to enhanced innovation. The results show that gender and education do not
significantly contribute to the bank innovativeness. However, the results should be
interpreted carefully, as the number of female directors in the sample is very low and
this leads to insignificant results. In 2012, UAE government has passed a legislation
requiring female board members in every public company. Although the female
directors quota has been announced by the end of 2012, they are not fully
implemented yet. Once the quotas are implemented, the effect of gender of directors
should be tested again.
The results show that boards with more experienced and independent directors
lead to more enhanced bank innovation. While the effect of experienced directors on
innovation increase during the crisis period, the effect of independent directors on
innovation decreases during the crisis term. Although, the literature has shown that
existence of independent directors leads to better overall value for the firm, their
impact on innovation might not be same. If the view that an insider director would
know more about the company’s core business, pay more attention to internal
development and will be more open to exploring and adopting new strategies
(Hoskisson et. al, 2002) is valid, then we would expect a negative or insignificant
effect of independent directors on the firm innovation. However, our results confirm
the view that independent directors have different risk perceptions (Hoskisson et. al.
2002), which leads to bold decisions towards innovation.
Future avenues of research include investigation of more countries in the
region and expand the data set by collecting data for more banks operating in the
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Middle East. It is also essential to compare the Islamic banks with the conventional
banks in their approach towards innovation and corporate governance.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Components of Innovation Index (2002-2005)
Loans
Invest
Off-Bal
Fixed
Labor
Borrowed
Obs
100
100
100
100
100
100
Mean
114,553
42,837
5,391
1,324
714
5,924
SD
44,391
20,361
2,539
668
383
2,522
25%
65,895
16,589
2,074
557
332
3,358
50%
75%
Kur
Skw
Min
Max

112,866
104,653
-0.71
0.03
36,079
205,914

38,805
35,817
-0.97
0.05
11,477
83,794

5,624
4,910
-0.80
0.00
1,186
10,550

1,362
1,274
-1.10
-0.02
265
2,646

653
581
-0.99
0.31
185
1,531

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Control Variables (2002-2005)
Board Ind
Dual
Meet
Govt
Obs
100
100
100
100
100
Mean
8
3.9
0.35
10.1
0.6994
SD
1.95 1.65
0.49
1.80
0.12
25%
6
3
0
8
0.63
50%
8
3
0
11
0.63
75%
6
3
0
8
0.63
Kur
-0.76 3.80
-1.72
-1.23
2.43
Skw
0.19 1.89
0.68
0.19
1.88
Min
5
2
0
8
0.63
Max
11
9
1
13
1

5,624
5,285
-0.97
0.05
1,904
10,892

Asset
100
45,851
15,201
25,420
58,243
88,246
-0.85
0
22,352
98,685

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics - Independent Variables (2012-2015)
Female
Ed_Und
Ed_Grad
Exp
Obs
100
100
100
100
Mean
0.2
5.1
2.8
6.8
SD
0.41
1.52
0.62
1.85
25%
0
4
2
3
50%
0
5
3
6
75%
0
4
2
8
Kur
0.70
0.22
-0.21
0.25
Skw
1.62
0.72
0.12
0.35
Min
0
3
2
1
Max
1
8
4
11
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Table 4: Mean Comparison Test
Parametric analysis: Mean-comparison test
Board
Indep
Dual
Meet
Govt
Asset
Loans
Invest
Off-Bal
Fixed
Labor
Borrowed
Female
Ed_Und
Ed_Grad
Exp

Pre-data Post-data
9
8
8
2
0.3
0.4
10
8
0.7
0.7
40,215
52,001
101,012
148,628
59,080
40,765
8,052
7,027
1,985
2,598
1,125
867
3,250
8,226
0
1
8
5
6
4
4
7

Mean Difference
-1
-6
0.1
-2
0
11,786
47,616
(18,315)
(1,025)
613
(258)
4,976
1
-3
-2
3

p-values
0.567
0.432
0.452
0.094
0.857
0.020
0.023
0.032
0.421
0.632
0.852
0.412
0.120
0.124
0.123
0.035

Non parametric analysis: K-S Test
Pre-Cum Post-Cum
9
8
9
2
0.4
0.3
11
9
0.75
0.75
42,102
50,125
100,025
140,967
62,020
39,087
8,111
7,127
2,010
2,583
1,012
821
2,850
9,462
0
1
7
5
5
3
5
7

Combine K-S
-1
-7
0.1
-2
0
8,023
40,942
(22,933)
(984)
573
(191)
6,612
1
-2
-2
2

p-values
0.852
0.452
0.678
0.050
0.723
0.035
0.034
0.042
0.521
0.723
0.854
0.521
0.220
0.142
0.222
0.042
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Table 5: Regression Tests
Explanatory
Variables
Female
Ed_Und
Ed_Grad
Exp
Indep
Board
Asset
Dual
Meet
Govt
Constant
n (firm-year)
R-Sq
Adj R-Sq

INV Index
Pre-Crisis

INV Index
-12.895
(30.43)
25.012
(35.62)
-37.521
(23.85)
4.258
(1.22)
5.852
(1.35)
2.325
(5.33)
4.21
(5.32)
2.323
(1.65)
6.243
(8.52)
3.215
(5.25)
-5.214
(6.25)
100
13.25
12.85

**
***

-14.25
(30.21)
26.325
(29.33)
-38.524
(26.58)
2.325
(1.40)
8.529
(2.35)
3.253
(5.32)
5.32
(4.21)
2.02
(1.21)
5.852
(7.62)
2.985
(6.52)
5.248
(6.99)
50
14.56
13.89

INV Index
Post-Crisis

*
***

*

-17.012
(33.33)
28.985
(30.22)
-33.325
(26.32)
7.777
(1.23)
3.453
(2.01)
2.23
(4.21)
3.42
(2.85)
2.325
(1.85)
7.285
(8.85)
3.012
(5.98)
-8.245
(8.52)
50
12.52
12.05

Wald
0.012
0.521
0.214
***

3.890

**

*

3.020

**

1.250
3.020
0.250
1.258
0.528
1.246
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